In his 2004 article, University of Chicago economist Allen R. Sanderson vents at facts of the sporting world that he sees as unjust. Raising a number of questions, Sanderson tries to point out the irony of common public impressions toward the entertainment world. Seemingly angered by the public’s conceptions, Sanderson is in a way questioning human nature and the ways society as a whole behaves.
Sanderson questions the public’s scorn toward performance enhancing drug use by athletes while it accepts the use of cosmetic enhancements by entertainers. In his view, both the athlete and the entertainer are trying to gain an advantage, but doing so in a manner that may negatively affect their health. He correctly points out that both situations harm the user of the substance, who is trying to gain a competitive advantage. But he is not addressing the fact that life, though competitive, it is not a competition. A competition is meant to determine a winner, doing so by utilizing regulations meant to make it fair. Cheaters are therefore scorn worthy – they undermine what makes the entire competition worthwhile. Obviously, the fact that life is not always fair and has no specific set of rules to make it that way disqualifies it from being a competition. Thus an actress utilizing a legal drug that makes her look younger is not the same as an athlete using an illegal drug to be faster. They are both trying to be better able to perform their jobs, but the athlete does so in a manner that diminishes the essence of that which he does, which is compete. It is the moral issue of this drug use that matters, and anytime a competitor seeks an advantage in a manner that is knowingly illegal is contemptible. There is no reason, therefore, to commiserate with these cheating athletes.
In another instance, Sanderson defends the NCAA Division I basketball and football players. He does point out a seemingly unjust scenario, for these athletes are not legally allowed to be paid a cent, even though they generate millions of dollars for the university. This is an appreciable argument. However, these collegiate athletes, in general, are not yet able to perform at a professional level. They may dream of doing so, but until then, they are not professional athletes. If they are this good, however, they are most likely to be on a scholarship that pays for their tuition and housing. The true gift of the university, therefore, is that it prepares these athletes for a professional athletic career without a charge to them. Before entering college, an athlete may have had to pay for his own coaching or for certain facilities. These are now given to him with the intent of developing him into a professional athlete. Above all, the gift of an education is granted to these scholar-athletes, something that they can take with them their entire lives. The fact that many students cannot attend college because of its costs would put these scholarship athletes in a truly fortunate situation. Yet Sanderson sees this process as universities “stealing” from these “poor” athletes. It is true that the athlete may be poor compared to those who profit off of his talent, but in the same respect he is put in a situation full of opportunity. He may develop his athletic talents to a marketable level, at which point he can become professional, or he can earn a degree (for free) and become professional in a non-athletic field. The athlete is only going to gain in this situation.
